Abstract This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as "of" two different objects-in two different senses of the phrase 'idea of'. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thusand-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of "ofness" come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions.
Introduction
In the long history of philosophical reflection about intentionality-how thought is directed at the world-the seventeenth century is generally regarded as a heyday of innovation. The novelty has sometimes been exaggerated: scholars are increasingly emphasizing close connections between Early Modern theories of "ideas" and late Scholastic accounts of "concepts." 1 In this paper, nevertheless, I will call attention to what I think is one genuinely new feature of some Early Modern theorizing about intentionality, a feature that has been overlooked. This is a pity, since it is a feature that goes missing in present-day theories, but deserves to be taken seriously.
According to the Scholastic tradition, cognition is (very roughly) a process in which the same forms that structure things in the world come to structure or "inform" our various cognitive capacities, starting with the sensory faculty and ending with the intellect. This theory is meant to accomplish two explanatory tasks at the same time. On the one hand, it is meant to address the question (1) What accounts for our ability to entertain a thought that thus-and-so, and hence to make a judgment that is true or false depending on how things are?
On the other hand, the sharing of forms between things in the world and our cognitive capacities is meant to explain our successful use of these capacities. If we can understand how something's form comes to structure the intellect, this promises to let us understand how we might approach a grasp of that thing's nature. And such a grasp would count, in the highest degree, as successful use of our cognitive capacities. So the sharing of forms is also meant to address the question (2) What accounts for the success of our proper methods of inquiry?
When Early Modern philosophers either jettison or radically reconstruct the Scholastic framework for understanding cognition, the possibility emerges that each of these explanatory tasks may require its own conceptual tools. This paper will examine how two very different Early Modern thinkers, Descartes and Locke, find themselves needing to appeal to two different ways the same "idea" can be directed at an object. According to both philosophers, the same idea can be directed at two different objects. It can be the 'idea of' two different objects, in two different senses of the phrase.
One of these senses corresponds to the first of the above explanatory tasks: accounting for how we can make judgments that are true or false depending on how things are. Since this sense will be elucidated in terms of how ideas contribute to propositional mental acts, I will call it the propositional sense of 'idea of'. In addition to the propositional sense, which is common to Descartes and Locke, I will argue that each philosopher employs his own contrasting sense.
These other senses correspond to the different ways Descartes and Locke approach the second explanatory task, that of accounting for cognitive success. But since both philosophers use the word 'represent' in this connection, I will speak in both cases of a representational sense of 'idea of'. 2 The structure of my interpretation is summarized in Table 1 .
To account for
Descartes appeals to Locke appeals to truth-evaluable propositional acts propositional intentionality propositional intentionality certain kinds of cognitive success representational intentionality (Cartesian version) representational intentionality (Lockean version) For each philosopher, the twofold intentional directedness underwrites two kinds of normativity. On the one hand, Descartes and Locke share the traditional view that judgments are subject to a norm of truth, and we will see that what it takes for a judgment to achieve truth depends on the propositional intentionality of the ideas employed in the judgment. On the other hand, both philosophers hold that there are norms governing the improvement of ideas, the achievement of which will be explained in terms of their representational intentionality. For both philosophers, these representational norms will be a matter of how our ideas are beholden to mind-independent natures: Cartesian "true and immutable natures" or Lockean "real essences."
I have three aims in telling this story. First, I hope to show how my reading of Descartes and Locke resolves puzzles posed by their texts: in Descartes's case the notorious puzzle of "materially false ideas," in Locke's case the analogous but neglected puzzle of "inadequate ideas." (In each case, the puzzle is why what is alleged to be a deficient idea of some object doesn't count instead as an idea of another object.) Here I will draw on interpretations I have elaborated and defended in far greater detail elsewhere. 3 Second, by pointing to the very different pressures that explain why each philosopher needs to appeal to two kinds of intentionality, I hope to illuminate their respective fundamental commitments concerning cognition. In each case, the need results from a characteristic rationalist commitment: in Locke's case the rationalism concerns question (1), while in Descartes's case it concerns question (2).
Third, I will suggest that understanding why Descartes and Locke are driven to bifurcate intentionality should carry a lesson even for those present-day theorists who reject both rationalist commitments.
Descartes
My first task will be to explain the propositional sense of the phrase 'idea of', by exhibiting it as a familiar sense Descartes takes for granted when elucidating his talk of ideas. After that, I will present evidence that the propositional sense doesn't suffice for his explanatory purposes, and offer an account of the contrasting representational sense.
Propositional ofness
In a letter written to Mersenne as the Meditations awaited publication (AT 3:391-7, CSMK 3:184-7 4 ), Descartes stresses an ordinary, theoretically noncommittal sense in which a mental entity can count as an "idea of" something. He does so in response to an anonymous objector who claims to be puzzled by his talk of "the idea of God, the idea of the soul, and (in general) the ideas of imperceptible things" from which we receive no sensory images (3) (4) (5) (6) The point here is a simple one. My idea of God, Descartes is saying, is whatever I conceive when I use the word 'God', and my idea of the soul is whatever I conceive when I use the word 'soul'.
He then generalizes over all such examples:
[W]e cannot express anything by our words, when we understand what we are saying, without its being certain thereby that we have in us the idea of the thing which is signified by our words. (AT 3:393, CSMK 3:185, emphasis added; see also the Second Replies at AT 7:160, CSM 2:113)
If I conceive anything at all in using the word 'God', Descartes is saying, my mind has the idea of God. If I conceive anything at all in using the word 'soul', my mind has the idea of a soul.
And so on. 6 When explaining what he means by an "idea of something," why does Descartes point to a relation between ideas and words? The answer is that his explanation in terms of words follows from a more fundamental principle that doesn't involve words. According to him, ideas serve to determine the overall "form" of "thoughts" (AT 7:160, CSM 2:113; AT 7:37, CSM 2:25-6). For 5 Mori 2012 offers biographical, textual and philosophical evidence that the objector, whose letter Descartes received from Mersenne, was Hobbes.
6 Cf. Perler 1996, 13-4. 7 It may be objected that in the same letter Descartes rejects a distinction between two kinds of ideas, those "expressed by terms" and those expressed "by propositions" (AT 3:396, CSMK 3:186) . For my purposes, however, it won't matter whether we talk about a thought that God is infinite or a thought of God as infinite, as long as this specification immediately determines a truth condition for a possible judgment. Cf. Perler 1996, 257-61 and Nuchelmans 1983, 42-4 . For the dialectical context of Descartes's rejection of the above distinction, see Mori 2012. 8 Elsewhere, I have argued that this sense is essential to understanding one strand of Descartes's epistemology: his view that we can delineate the natures of things by contemplation of what is contained in our clear and distinct ideas of them (Shapiro 2012, 396-8) . 9 Lenz 2010a, 254 (my translation Third Meditation scenario My idea of cold might turn out to represent something other than cold to me. In that case it would misrepresent its object, and therefore count as a false idea of cold. 10 Fodor 1998, 6. 11 The extensive literature on Descartes and material falsity is examined in Shapiro 2012; see also De Rosa 2010 and Naaman-Zauderer 2010. My reading of Descartes's reply to Arnauld is most influenced by Margaret Wilson, who proposes that Descartes is distinguishing between two "senses of … 'idea of'," namely a "presentational" and a "referential" sense (Wilson 1990, 69-70, 73-4) . But neither of Wilson's two senses lines up with either of the two senses I attribute to Descartes (see Shapiro 2012, 401) . 12 An exception is Wee 2006, 55-8. Arnauld then objects that this scenario is incoherent. According to him, an idea that represents something other than cold "is not the idea of cold" (AT 7:207, CSM 2:146 Here he is invoking common late Scholastic terminology, found in Suárez as well as the Coimbran commentators he studied at school. 14 To take a concept or idea formally is to regard it insofar as it represents some object to the mind. Expressed using vocabulary Descartes uses interchangeably, it is to consider that object insofar as it "is objectively in the intellect." 15
Descartes concedes that Arnauld's premise is true if the term 'idea of cold' is taken in the "formal sense" Arnauld intends. By contrast, he says, Arnauld's premise is false if 'idea of cold'
is taken in Descartes's own intended sense, which is apparently the above-mentioned "material" sense:
13 For criticism of common readings according to which Descartes agrees with Arnauld that the scenario is incoherent, and denies that it is what he had in mind in the Third Meditation, see Shapiro 2012, 391-3. 14 Suárez (1597 Suárez ( /1960 .16/2:106) is cited by Wells (1984, 32n36) . For similar passages from Pedro da Fonseca and Antonio Rubio, see Clemenson 2007, 43-5. 15 More precisely, I claim that Descartes uses the two locutions interchangeably when discussing the intentional directedness of ideas. I take no position on the contested ontology of objective being in Descartes: i.e. whether or not the act of the intellect that represents some object is really distinct from the object insofar as it is objectively in the intellect, what Descartes elsewhere call an idea "taken objectively" (AT 7:8, CSM 2:7). See e.g. Ayers 1998 Ayers , 1067 [I]f cold is simply a privation, the idea of cold [taken materially] is not cold itself insofar as it is objectively in the intellect [that is to say, it does not represent cold], but something else, … namely a sensation which has no existence outside the intellect. (AT 7:233, CSM 2:163) Taken in the material sense, the idea is still of cold (here supposed to be a privation), even though what the idea represents to the mind is a mere sensation. 16 Hence the Third Meditation scenario, interpreted as Descartes had intended, is perfectly coherent.
But what is Descartes's intended "material" sense, such that whether an idea is "of cold" in this sense doesn't depend on its representing cold to the mind? I will now argue that the material sense is simply the propositional sense. That is because this reading makes best sense of how he explains the consequences of taking the idea of cold materially: His point seems to be this. Which of my ideas counts as an idea of cold in the propositional sense doesn't depend on whether cold turns out to be something metaphysically "true" or "false"-a real quality or an unreal privation. By contrast, which of my ideas counts as representing cold to my mind does depend on what cold turns out to be. If cold is a positive being, a "different idea" of mine will count as being "of cold" in the formal sense than if cold is a privation. So, depending on what cold turns out to be, I have a "different idea of it" in the formal sense. But whether cold is a positive being or a privation, I certainly have "the same idea of it" in the propositional sense. This is the idea I express by 'cold', the idea I use when I wonder, e.g., whether cold might be a privation. Taken in the propositional sense, it can't turn out that this idea isn't really "of cold"! We have now found Descartes's explanation of why the Third Meditation scenario is coherent.
The idea of mine that is guaranteed to be of cold in the "material" or propositional sense might turn out to be an idea of something else in the "formal sense. 
Representational ofness
Where Descartes speaks of the idea of an object in the "formal sense," let me speak of an idea of that object in the representational sense. So far, I have said nothing to explain this sense, but have merely argued that Descartes distinguishes representational from propositional ofness. To understand the role that representational ofness plays in Descartes's thought, it will be useful to have a few examples.
The Third Meditation scenario under discussion between Descartes and Arnauld is purely hypothetical: there is reason to think Descartes doesn't regard cold as a privation. 17 But he says that the same predicament as in his hypothetical case "often happens in the case of obscure and confused ideas…" (AT 7:233, CSM 2:163). What actual examples, then, might he have in mind of ideas that are propositionally of something they fail to be representationally of? Consider first the confused idea a non-philosopher expresses by the word 'cold'. 18 Perhaps this idea is
propositionally of a quality in bodies, a quality the vulgar call 'cold', one that from the standpoint of Descartes's science has turned out to be a certain state of motion. Yet, as I have interpreted the Fourth Replies, the same idea is representationally of another object, namely a sensation which exists only in the mind. The non-philosopher may confuse this sensation with the object the idea is propositionally of, namely (we are supposing) the state of motion she calls 'cold'. This would explain why she is liable to form a false judgment as to the latter quality's nature. 19 Second, there is the Third Meditation's example of the ordinary "idea of the sun" which seems to be "acquired from the senses" (AT 7:39, CSM 2:27). This is an example used by the Coimbran commentators, who argue that the perception represents a small disk, not the sun. 20 I believe there is reason to hold that Descartes is agreeing with them that this idea represents a small disk, rather than the sun. 21 Still, on his view, it remains an idea of the sun in the propositional sense. It is the idea a peasant uses in forming the false judgment that the sun is 17 Hoffman 1996 and Nelson 1996. smaller than the earth. Indeed, what accounts for this false judgment is that the peasant confuses the two objects the idea is "of" in the two senses.
A third likely example comes from a letter written in 1645:
When the ancients named [nommoient] many gods they did not mean many all-powerful gods, but only many very powerful gods, above whom they imagined a single Jupiter as sovereign; and consequently, to this Jupiter alone the applied the idea of the true God, this idea being presented to them in a confused manner. (AT 4:188, CSMK 3:248) Here Descartes appears to be saying that the idea a pagan priest expressed by 'Iuppiter' is in one sense an idea of the true God. 22 Clearly, however, the pagan's idea is propositionally of Jupiter.
When the pagan asserts the Latin equivalent of 'Jupiter is subject to the fates' (cf. AT 1:145, CSMK 3:23), he is asserting that Jupiter is subject to the fates, not that the true God is subject to the fates. The pagan confuses the true God his idea represents with the mythological object the idea is propositionally of. Table 2 , may help us answer the most pressing question: Why does Descartes appeal to representational ofness in addition to propositional ofness? My proposal is that the role of representational ofness needs to be understood in terms of Descartes's theory of clear and distinct ideas. On one attractive reading, a clear and distinct idea is an idea that perspicuously reveals the nature of the object it is an "idea of" in the propositional sense. For example, a clear and distinct idea of body is an idea that enables one to judge with certainty that body is extended substance. 23 According to Descartes, rational reflection of the 22 See Wee 2006, 56-7. 23 For similar readings of clarity and distinctness see Alanen 2003, 159 and Clemenson 2007, 72-5. Take, for example, the confused idea our pagan priest expresses by 'Iuppiter' (see Table 3 ).
While this idea is propositionally of Jupiter, it is representationally of the true God. This status explains how the pagan is capable of reflectively refining the idea to yield a clear and distinct idea that is propositionally of the true God, and perspicuously reveals his nature. And this is the sense in which "the idea of God is imprinted on the human mind in such a way that everyone has within himself the power to know him" (AT 4:187, CSMK 3:248).
It is this kind of presence of an object to the mind that representational ofness consists in: a kind of presence for which Descartes is happy to borrow the Scholastic terminology of "objective being in the intellect." My thesis so far has been that this kind of Cartesian intentionality, a kind responsible for our ability to achieve clear and distinct understanding of "true and immutable natures," needs to be distinguished from the kind I have called propositional, the kind responsible for a judgment's truth conditions. Suppose we wish to determine whether this oddly-shaped fellow is a man, i.e. whether he deserves to be "ranked" into the human species-or, in Locke's preferred linguistic formulation, whether he has a "right to the name Man" and thus has the "nominal essence" of this sort or species (3.3.12:414-5, 3.3.18:419) . 27 What we're really interested in when we ask this question is the truth of a "mental proposition," namely the proposition that an animal with such-and-such features and capabilities is a man. According to Locke's theory of "mental propositions," this proposition is formed by "joining" two ideas (4.5.2:574, 4.5.5:575-6). 28 What are these two ideas "of"? As long as 'idea of' is used in the propositional sense, there is an immediate answer:
the first is the idea of such-and-such an animal, and the second is the idea of a man. Finally, the proposition will be true provided these two ideas "agree" with each other with respect to "necessary connexion" in the same subject (4. 1.3:525, 4.7.5:594) . And that requires that 25 In Shapiro 1999, 587-90, I proposed that Locke's distinction between the nominal and real essences of substance kinds coincides with a distinction between kinds of content (cf. Prinz 2000) . Here, I follow Shapiro 2010 in explaining that distinction in terms of propositional and representational intentionality.
26 References in this format will be to Locke's Essay (by book, chapter, section, and page number in Locke 1975) . 27 Though Locke insists that his usage of 'species' and 'sort' is a mere matter of Latin versus English (3.3.12:414, 3.5.9:434), 'species' typically expresses a contrast with 'genus' less often expressed by 'sort' (e.g. not at 3.3.15:417, 3.6.1:439). Locke's English for 'genus' is 'kind' (2.32.6:386, 3.1.6:404), though this term too is often used without any intended contrast (2.32.24:393, 4.6.4:580). Here I will use 'species' as the Lockean term. 28 Perler 1996, 261n notes that Locke's theory of mental proposition has no counterpart in Descartes. This difference needn't prevent us from isolating a common notion of propositional ofness in both philosophers: see note 7 above.
whatever "conforms to" the idea of such-and-such an animal necessarily also "conforms to" the idea of a man. 29 Summarizing, we can say that what it takes for something to belong to the species man is for it to conform to an idea that is "of a man" in the propositional sense, such as the idea I express by 'man ' (3.3.12:414-5, 3.6.7:443) . Suppose now that my idea is the one Locke says people "commonly" express by that word, namely the idea of "a Body of the ordinary shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, and Reason join'd to it" (4.6.15:589-90). Then I can say that being a man is a matter of being a body of the ordinary shape with sense, voluntary motion and reason joined to it. In short, by contemplating the composition of a complex idea of mine that countsin the propositional sense-as an idea of man, I can come to know necessary and sufficient conditions for being a man. This will be important in Sect. 4.
Why propositional ofness is not enough
I am now ready to argue that Locke also appeals to a second, non-propositional sense in which an idea can be "of" a species of substance. Switching from man to Locke's other favorite species, suppose that the complex idea we express by the word 'gold' is composed out of ideas of yellowness, a certain density, malleability, fusibility, solidity, and extension, together with the idea of their union "in an unknown substratum" (cf. 2.24.37:317, 2.32.23:392 and 3.6.2:439).
Call this complex idea IDEA1. Locke stresses that IDEA1 fails to be "a perfect complete Idea, of a sort of things" (2.32.23:392). For it omits, among other features, fixedness (non-volatility), which has been observed to coexist with the features already included. And he urges natural historians to "rectify" this imperfection:
[W]e … must enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their distinct Species … [W]e must, by acquainting ourselves with the History of that sort of Things, rectify and settle our complex Idea, belonging to each specifick name. (3.11.24:520-1; see also 3.11.25:521-2)
Suppose, in what follows, that we have followed Locke's advice and added the idea of fixedness to IDEA1, and that we now use our word 'gold' to express the resulting "perfected" idea IDEA2.
We can now formulate a puzzle modeled on Arnauld's puzzle for Descartes. As we will soon see, Locke repeatedly makes two claims that appear to be inconsistent: (a) IDEA1 and IDEA2 are ideas of distinct species.
(b) IDEA2 is a more perfect idea of the same species of which IDEA1 was an idea.
Notice the parallel with Arnauld's charge that Descartes is committed to the claim that a given idea might simultaneously be a "materially false idea of cold" and an idea of something other than cold. Unlike Arnauld's puzzle, this puzzle hasn't received attention; indeed, Locke's claim silver, a man, etc. Since "each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct Species," he argues, the "sorting of Things is the Workmanship of Men" (3.6.37-8:462-3; also 3.5.7:432, 3.3.14:416-17). As explained above, whether some object counts as gold depends for Locke on whether the object conforms to the idea of gold in the propositional sense. So 'idea of' in claim (a) expresses propositional ofness. This lets us fill in our first column in Table 4 . After all, the idea I now express by 'gold' is, in the propositional sense, an idea of gold. According to Locke's claim (a), then, the idea I formerly expressed by the word 'gold' must have been an idea of a distinct species, one that doesn't require fixedness.
By contrast, Locke endorses claim (b) in contexts where he isn't focusing on the role of our ideas in determining what counts as gold, silver, a man, etc. Instead, when he stresses that we "have different Ideas of the same Substance" (3.9.13:482-3), he is explaining that our complex ideas are "imperfect and inadequate" as "representations" of the species of substances found in nature (2.31.6:378, 2.31.11:382, 2.31.13:383). 31 As we have seen, he concludes from this that 30 See esp. Ayers 1991 , vol. 2: 75-7, Mattern 1986 , and Atherton 2007 There is an explicit cross-reference from the opening sentence of 3.9.12:482 to the opening sentence of 2.31.6:378. In both places, Locke contrasts the inadequacy he has in mind with a second inadequacy: substance ideas also count as inadequate when (inappropriately) regarded as revealing the "real essences" of species.
"we must … perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their distinct Species." Yet he concedes that our ideas will never be "exact Representations" of these species (3.9.20:488; also 3.9.17:486, 2.31.8-10:380-2, 2.32.24:392-3, 4.3.26:556-7) . In other words, IDEA1 and IDEA2 are more or less imperfect representations of the same species of substance. 32 Let us refer to the species in question, the one mentioned in claim (b), as G. Locke himself, well aware that he can't identify this species as gold, picks out G using descriptions such as "that sort of Substance, we denote by the word Gold" (2.31.9-10:381-2) or "that sort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of" (3.9.17:486). 33 In short, I have argued that according to Locke, an idea that is "of gold" in the propositional sense will also count as an idea "of" some other species in a sense relevant to representation. 
Representational ofness
To understand how IDEA1 and IDEA2 count as representing the same species G, we must turn to the three chapters of the Essay (2.30-32) devoted to ideas taken "in reference to things … which they may be supposed to represent." Here Locke's central question is this: To what extent do our various ideas "have a Conformity … with their Archetypes"? By 'archetype' he means a model to which something else is intended to conform. And he argues that two kinds of ideas, simple ideas and complex ideas of substances, are appropriately intended to conform to archetypes outside the mind. He stresses that the relevant "conformity" between idea and object isn't the 32 In several of these passages, Locke doesn't expressly note that he is talking about species rather than individuals. Yet taken together, and in their contexts, they demand the former construal. In once instance, Locke clarifies his intention in the Essay's fourth edition. Rather than speak of that person who "has the perfectest Idea of any particular Substance" he now speaks of that person who "has the perfectest Idea of any of the particular sorts of Substance" (2.23.7:299) . 33 In two striking passages (analyzed in Shapiro 1999, 561-4) , Locke complains of how "hard it is" to specify the species of which IDEA1 and IDEA2 are imperfect ideas without "cross[ing his] purpose" by using the word 'gold' rather than just mentioning it (3.6.19:449, 3.6.43:465-6 Locke's account of representation as conformity to an appropriate archetype is spelled out most explicitly for simple ideas. 34 But there is every reason to think the general account is supposed to apply to complex ideas of substances as well. Here conformity by correlation needs to be understood as follows.
Conformity by correlation Suppose I have a complex idea (propositionally) of a substance with features F 1 , F 2 , … F n . My idea conforms by correlation to a species S to the extent that having features F 1 , F 2 , … F n correlates with belonging to species S, and can thus serve to distinguish things of that species. (For sets of qualities serving as "marks" used to "distinguish" substance species, see 2.23.8:300 and 4.6.11:585.)
I can now say what I think it means for an idea to be "of" a species of substance in Locke's representational sense.
Representation ofness and adequacy My complex idea is representationally of a substance
species S provided I appropriately intend that the idea conform by correlation to S. And such an idea will adequately represent the species S to the extent that it does conform by correlation to S.
This account of representation explains what Locke means when he approves of those natural
historians who intend their substance ideas to be "Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by Ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them" (2.31.6:378, 2.31.8:380-1, 3.9.13:482). And it explains why he says, concerning our "specific Ideas of Substances," that we should "endeavour … to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple Ideas, as being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the Species" (4.12.14:648).
But what is the species G such that I appropriately intend that the combination of features singled out by the idea I express by 'gold' should correlate with membership in G? To answer the question, consider our purpose in employing substance ideas. Here is Locke's explanation of our purposes in forming all "abstract complex Ideas": In the case of substance ideas, this goal will amount to inductive projectibility. When I discover that a particular piece of gold was dissolved by aqua regia, Locke holds, I can with fair "assurance" predict that other pieces will likewise be dissolved. 35 (For his interest in induction, see 4.3.29:560, 3.6.24:452, 4.6.13:588, and 4.12.10:645 .) It is our concern for inductive projectibility, then, that underwrites Locke's injunction that we should perfect our ideas of substance species so as to make them better represent their archetypes. Calling attention to two of the claims cited above, Richard Boyd remarks: "Officially in these passages Locke is addressing the problem of the 'inadequacy' of kinds [that is: ideas of kinds] of substances rather than the problem of inductive categories, but … I am inclined to think that he means the solution to apply to the latter problem as well." 36 Boyd's suggestion, which is bolstered by the displayed passage, lets us explain how a species G is picked out as the one represented by the idea I express by 'gold'. The key is that there is reason to attribute to Locke the following claim about what grounds inductive projectibility.
Projectibility and explanatory constitutions A substance idea is inductively projectible to the extent that it conforms by correlation to a species whose members share a common "internal constitution," one that explains their possession of the features already included in the idea, as
well as those additional features one will come to include if one continues to perfect the idea (by including features that have hitherto been "constantly observed to co-exist" with the set already included).
As Locke says, such a shared "real constitution … is the foundation of all those Properties, that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal Essence" (3.6.6:442). 35 This claim would require serious qualification to be defensible. However, here is all Locke need be committed to: the more we "perfect" a substance idea, the more we may expect that there will be reliable generalizations concerning "coexistence" of the features collected in the idea with additional ones, and this expectation is relevant to induction. 36 Boyd 1991, 131-2. If this is right, Locke's position resembles Boyd's own conception of "natural kinds" (1999; 2010), as well as that of Millikan 2000. According to the Scholastic metaphysical framework he adapts to his purposes, this internal constitution serves as the "real essence" of the species in question, the source from which "flow" the "endless" additional essential "properties" or propria of the species (2.32.24:392-3, 2.31.10:382, 3.11.22:520, 4.6.11:585) . 37 In short, Locke is saying that I appropriately intend that the complex idea I express by 'gold' should conform by correlation to the species G that is picked out by possession of this underlying constitution. This means that my idea is representationally of the species with the explanatory internal constitution. Yet my current idea is highly unlikely to perfectly represent that species.
There will be things that agree to my idea, and hence belong to the species my idea is propositionally of (namely the species gold), but don't belong to the species my idea is representationally of. This imperfect representation accounts for failures of induction. Locke recounts the "sad Experience" made by chymists "when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others" (3.6.8:443).
Though the chymists intend their substance ideas to conform to sorts with explanatory internal constitutions, their ideas end up doing so only imperfectly. Their ideas fail to be "exact representations" of the archetypes they are intended to conform to, and thus stand in need of perfecting. As Peter Anstey has recently observed, in the course of a reading that in many respects matches the one I have summarized here and elaborated elsewhere, Locke is a "convergent conventionalist" about our ideas of substance species. 38 37 On Locke's use of 'property' to mean proprium in the sense derived from Porphyry, see e.g. Ayers 1991, vol. 2, 21, 67-74 and Pasnau 2011, 658-60 . Contrary to Pasnau, I am arguing that Locke's embrace of natural kinds in the Essay does "depend on the notion of an explanatory essence" from which a species' observable properties flow. 38 Anstey 2011, ch. 11; cf. the section "Converging on a real essence" in Shapiro 1999 , 576-82. Kornblith 1993 2 sketches a similar account of Locke's implicit view of "chemical method," but claims it contradicts Locke's "official position." Several interpreters besides Anstey and myself have argued that Locke officially embraces natural kinds. However, their conceptions differ from the one I intend. According to Conn 2002 , what is required for there to be natural kinds is that (a) each set of perceptible features corresponds to some shared internal constitution. As I read Locke, he denies (a). Instead, he holds there to be natural kinds in the sense that (b) some ways of sorting objects by their perceptible features count as more natural than others, by coming closer to corresponding to a shared internal constitution. Though Stuart 1999, 285-91 discusses Boyd and Kornblith, I read him as attributing to Locke a qualified version of (a), not (b). On the other hand, Pasnau 2011, 642-7 attributes an embrace of natural kinds in a very strong sense, for which I find no evidence in the Essay: "there is a unique system of species (and higher genera) that best captures the similarities and differences among individuals." For an analysis of Locke's carefully reasoned ambivalence about whether there are any "prefixed Bounds" of species, any boundaries "made by 3.6.43:466) , see Shapiro 1999, 582-7. 
Cartesian and Lockean rationalism
We have now seen both Descartes and Locke make use of a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, each of which is appealed to in explaining or describing a different aspect of our mental lives. One kind, which both philosophers address using Scholastic metaphysical frameworks, is appealed to when answering question (2) This rationalism is tied to Locke's preoccupation with the possibility of clarifying and resolving apparent disagreements, such as the one concerning the abbot of St. Martin. Once you convey to me the simple components of the idea you express by 'man', we can agree on informative truth conditions for the propositions you express using that word (cf. 3.9.16:484-5, 3.11.7:511-12 ). But Descartes's example shows that a divorce between propositional and representational ofness needn't have this motivation. Unlike Locke, Descartes has remarkably little to say about question (1). There is no Cartesian theory of propositional intentionality. In Descartes's case, rather, the divorce is driven by his approach to question (2). This is where he, in turn, advocates a rationalist thesis. Yet, quite reasonably, Descartes concedes that the natures he takes to be revealed through rational reflection on our ideas may have little to do with the objects we are currently thinking of, in the propositional sense. Rational reflection on the idea the pagan priest expresses by 'Iuppiter' can yield an understanding of the nature of the true god, not of the chimerical non-thing his idea is propositionally of. Likewise, reflection on the confused sensory idea the non-philosopher expresses by 'cold' can reveal the nature of a sensation, not the physical quality this idea may be propositionally of. And no amount of reflection on the idea the peasant expresses by 'sun' can reveal the nature of the sun.
The fact that Locke's and Descartes's bifurcations of intentionality are driven by different rationalist commitments explains an important difference between them concerning the ways in which it can make sense to seek an improved idea of the same object. According to Descartes, one idea can be better than another in that it more perspicuously reveals a nature. Given that some confused ideas can have two different objects, this results in two very different kinds of cases in which two ideas count as better and worse ideas of the same object. On the one hand, there are cases where the better idea represents the same object as the worse idea, even though it counts as the idea of a new object in the propositional sense. Such a case is displayed in Table 3 .
Once our pagan makes his idea clear and distinct, it no longer counts, in the propositional sense, as an idea of Jupiter. On the other hand, there are also cases where the better idea remains an idea of the same object in the propositional sense, even though it may represent a new object. In order to go from believing that the sun is smaller than the earth to understanding that it is "several times larger than the earth" (AT 7:39, CSM 2:27), I must come to employ a radically new "idea of the sun" (in the propositional sense). Above, I suggested that these two ideas have distinct representational objects. In any case, it is evident that for Descartes the ends of inquiry can be furthered by replacing a confused idea with a clear and distinct one that remains (in the propositional sense) an idea of the same object. 40 Locke agrees with this claim in the case of simple ideas and ideas of modes. Here the idea serves not just as nominal essence of a species, but also as its real essence (3.3.18:418, 3.4.3:421, 3.5.14:436) . To learn what makes an action an injustice or makes a body crimson, it suffices to inspect the respective ideas (provided, in the latter case, that one has learned the general lessons of chapter 2.8 about color-ideas). Of course, such inspection is a far cry from the serious intellectual work Descartes envisions.
That is not so for Locke. By his lights, a better idea can't be one that more perspicuously reveals an explanatory nature. In this regard, all substance ideas are equally deficient-while all simple ideas and ideas of modes are equally flawless. 41 According to Lockean rationalism, the idea of each substance species (in the propositional sense) does reveal informative membership conditions for that species, but that is all that can be hoped for. Since he realizes that Cartesians demand more of their clear and distinct ideas, Locke eventually decides it is less misleading to replace the desideratum of "clear and distinct" ideas throughout the Essay's fourth edition with the desideratum of "determinate" ideas, ideas that are consistently expressed by the same name (Epistle:13; cf. 3.11.9:513). At the same time, in a passage quoted in Sect. 3.3 above, he inserts a qualification to the effect that "specific Ideas of Substances" are subject to an additional norm of perfection (4.12.14:648). What makes one substance idea better than another, assuming both are determinate, is just that the former better supports inductive inferences, as a consequence of conforming more perfectly by correlation to the species it represents. While successful inquiry calls for further perfecting the idea to make it more adequately represent that species, Locke would see no point in aiming to formulate a new complex idea that remains an idea of the same species in the propositional sense. 42
A lesson for current debates?
What if, together with many philosophers of an "externalist" bent, we reject both Cartesian rationalism and Lockean rationalism? 43 I think we can still draw the following lesson from the way Descartes and Locke bifurcate intentionality. Their shared insight is this: the purposes for which we seek an answer to question (1) differ so significantly from the purposes for which we seek an answer to question (2) that we have little reason to expect any neat connection between the kinds of intentionality each answer will invoke. This insight carries consequences for two broad approaches to mental and linguistic intentionality, one "anti-representationalist" and the other "representationalist."
41 See the previous note. 42 In conceding that Locke could even make sense of distinct complex ideas that share an object in the propositional sense, I am imagining that he would allow a qualification to (a) of Sect. 3.2. Consider the rare case in which distinct substance ideas mutually agree with respect to "necessary connexion," whence the same objects must conform to each idea. In such a case, I presume, he would count both ideas as being of the same species in the propositional sense. 43 For a defense of sophisticated versions of both Lockean and Cartesian rationalism, based on an entirely different bifurcation of content, see Chalmers 2012. On the one hand, I have in mind Robert Brandom's anti-representationalism concerning what I have called propositional intentionality, which corresponds to what he calls "discursive intentionality." 44 Even if Lockean rationalism is misguided on externalist grounds, Locke is surely right to stress the connection between our ascriptions of propositional attitudes and of truth or falsity and our interest in clarifying and resolving apparent disagreements. A sophisticated elaboration of this theme can be found in Brandom's view of our propositional intentional vocabulary as serving to make explicit what is implicit in our practice of challenging or deferring to one another's assertions. 45 Though Brandom doesn't explicitly motivate his antirepresentationalism this way, one might argue that once we appreciate this distinctive function of propositional intentional vocabulary, we will no longer be tempted by "representationalist" explanations what it is to speak or think that thus-and-so, and hence to speak or think "of something" in the propositional sense. In response to this motivation for anti-representationalism about Brandomian discursive intentionality, however, a representationalist could concede the point, but insist that she is pursuing question (2), not question (1). That is to say, she doesn't intend her accounts of mental or linguistic representation to serve in explanations of what it consists in to think or speak "of something" in the propositional sense. Furthermore, she can argue that theorists who concentrate exclusively on propositional ofness risk neglecting an important, and perhaps largely autonomous, dimension of the bearing of thought and language on the world. 46 On the other hand, there may also be a lesson for those representationalist theorists whose goal, as articulated by Ruth Millikan, is to "explain the mechanisms, including the contributions of supporting environmental structures, that together account for cases of proper cognitive functioning." 47 One such approach posits mechanisms which, on the occasions they have earned their keep by contributing to successful cognitive functioning, have done so by exploiting systematically specifiable correlations between mental or linguistic structures and objects, properties, or states of affairs. This is the broad approach taken by Millikan herself and by 44 See e.g. Brandom 2008, ch. 6. 45 See especially Brandom 1994, ch. 8. Boyd. 48 Here I would like to call attention to an assumption that is invariably made by such theorists. They assume that the representational notions they employ, in addressing question (2), can simultaneously be used to explain those semantic properties that we ordinarily attribute in virtue of our use of the propositional notions used in question (1). Such properties include reference and truth conditions as ordinarily understood: if a mental or linguistic item expresses the proposition that water is liquid, it follows immediately that it has the truth condition that water is liquid, and that it involves constituents that refer or apply to water and to liquid things.
The unargued assumption that the representationalist's intentional notions can be used to explain reference and truth conditions may place an unwarranted restriction on the theories of representation at issue.
Understanding how Descartes and Locke are driven to bifurcate intentionality can thus help bring into focus questions that diverse present-day approaches to intentionality have yet to sufficiently address. 49 
